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Note
STRATEGIES TO BRING DOWN A GIANT: AUER DEFERENCE
VULNERABLE AFTER REPRIEVE IN KISOR v. WILKIE
SHELBY M. KRAFKA*
“[A]fter hearing arguments in a case involving judicial deference
to agencies, [Justice Scalia] announced that Auer v. Robbins was
one of the Court’s ‘worst decisions ever.’ Although I gently reminded him that he had written Auer, that fact hardly lessened
his criticism of the decision or diluted his resolve to see it
overruled.”1
I. TODAY’S DAVIDS ARE ILL-EQUIPPED FOR BATTLE: HOW DEFERENCE CAN
STALL THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
The New Deal’s activist policies, which valued governmental efficiency, created the modern administrative state that has only grown and
expanded over the last eight decades.2 The public’s expectations of agencies also increased in the 1960s and 1970s, due to increased liberal activism, which consolidated power to federal regulators.3 Agencies now have
vast and overlapping functions in rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication.4 In promulgating rules, agencies must act in accordance with con* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2014, University of Texas at Austin. I would like to thank Professor Tammi
Etheridge for sparking my interest in the administrative state and providing
mentorship and guidance. I would also like to thank the staff of the Villanova Law
Review for their thoughtful feedback and assistance in the publication of this Note.
1. Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 n.12
(2018) (quoting Clarence Thomas, A Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 126 YALE L.J.
1600, 1603 (2017)); see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (providing judicial deference to agency interpretations of its own ambiguous regulations); see, e.g.,
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 111–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(questioning validity of Auer deference given judiciary’s constitutional role in interpreting law).
2. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining the Administrative Process: Normative, Positive,
and Critical Stories of Development, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 272–73 (1990) (reasoning New Deal era legal theorists recognized agencies’ role as a pragmatic approach
to resolve growing social issues).
3. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
67 (Harvard U. Press 1990) (crediting passage of Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
to public’s growing awareness of social problems created by industry leaders resistant to regulation).
4. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 638 (1996) (explaining well-
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gressional authorization and obtain guidance from the rulemaking
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).5 Agencies, unlike
the Legislature, have subject-matter expertise that has been widely
credited with increasing governmental efficiency.6 Additionally, the public often demands changes to regulated areas, such as consumer product
safety, workplace safety, or automobile safety, and agencies are often able
to promulgate rules more quickly than Congress by employing agency resources.7 While agency rules may protect and promote the interests of the
general public, agencies, like Congress, are also subject to the rent-seeking
and lobbying efforts of special interest groups.8
After an agency promulgates a rule, that agency generally has the
power to interpret any ambiguity by issuing informal guidance to clarify
the rule’s meaning.9 Ambiguity in regulations occurs for a variety of reasons, including (1) careless drafting; (2) the drafters’ inability to capture
every detail of the regulated area; or (3) new applications of the rule that
established assumptions that modern administrative agencies effectively exercise
law-making power to both adopt rules and enforce them).
5. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 81 (Princeton U. Press ed., 2008) (detailing
congressional process of authorizing agencies; Congress enacts statutes to create
agencies and confer jurisdiction). Under the APA, agencies are authorized to issue rules by: (1) providing notice of its contemplated rule in the Federal Register; (2)
allowing interested parties the opportunity to comment, propose alternative language, and provide relevant data; and (3) publishing its final rule thirty days
before implementation and summarizing changes, if any, to the rule. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (2018); CROLEY, supra, at 82–83. After authorizing rulemaking power to
agencies, Congress still retains oversight and provides input to regulated areas. See
CROLEY, supra, at 116.
6. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (noting
agency expertise comes from experience administering “complex and highly technical regulatory program[s]” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680, 697 (1991))); see also Mashaw, supra note 2, at 273 (theorizing administrative
law’s goal is to provide flexibility and enable problem-solving).
7. See CROLEY, supra note 5, at 115–16 (recognizing agencies promulgate
about five times as many rules as Congress passes bills in a given year). Agency
resources include the institutional knowledge of its administrators, consultations
from neutral policy experts, and credible data provided by public comments. See
id. at 136, 146, 297.
8. See Donald J. Kochnan, The Mask of Virtue: Theories of Aretaic Legislation in a
Public Choice Perspective, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 295, 325 (2014). Rent-seeking is the process of interest groups seeking favorable regulation for their cause from regulators,
who in return receive benefits for their future political and economic success. See
id. For an analysis of regulators’ motivations in agency decision-making, see infra
Section V.A.
9. See Deborah T. Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of Labor’s
Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (2013). In stark contrast to
formal rulemaking, informal rulemaking can include agency guidelines, dear colleague letters, amicus briefs filed during litigation, press releases, and explanatory
statements in the Federal Register. See id.; CROLEY, supra note 5, at 111–12 (acknowledging agencies issue “tens if not hundreds of thousands” informal guidelines per
year).
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the drafters could not have reasonably foreseen at the time of drafting.10
As agencies’ interpretive function has grown to clarify ambiguities, courts
have wrestled with what standard of review is appropriate for agency interpretations.11 Over the last thirty years, courts have applied a standard of
review mandating deference to reasonable agency interpretations of its
own ambiguous regulations, which the United States Supreme Court announced in Auer v. Robbins.12 Courts have applied Auer deference to regulations that impact the daily lives of Americans, including in employment,
education, and access to safe food and medication.13
Critics of Auer deference argue that agencies abuse the doctrine by
intentionally drafting ambiguous regulations.14 The recent public battle
over whether transgender students are entitled to use bathrooms corresponding with their gender identity illustrates Auer’s application and
faults.15 First, the issue exemplifies how regulatory ambiguity can arise
10. See LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 484 (2d ed.
2013) (acknowledging complexities in drafting clear statutory language).
11. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 564–67 (1985) (discussing analogous precedent for statutory ambiguity). See generally CROLEY, supra note 5, at 99–100 (noting judicial review of
agency decision-making takes place only after a regulated party brings litigation).
For a further discussion of the Supreme Court’s precedent on judicial deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations, see infra Sections II.A, IV.A.
12. 519 U.S. 452, 460–62 (1997). The deferential standard of review now
known as “Auer deference” was first articulated in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., so it is often also referred to as “Seminole Rock deference.” See, e.g., Ronald A.
Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation’s Defect, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 531,
569 (2018) (referring to deference doctrine as “Seminole Rock–Auer deference”);
Manning, supra note 4, at 614 (using term “Seminole Rock deference” to refer to
deference granted to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations). See generally Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding
agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations should be afforded “controlling
weight” even if interpretation is not regulation’s most natural reading).
13. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613–14 (2011) (providing
Auer deference to Food and Drug Administration’s interpretation of generic drug
labeling regulations where respondents argued less stringent standard resulted in
development of severe neurological disorder); Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007) (providing Auer deference to Department of
Labor interpretation excluding companionship service providers, including certified nursing aids, home caregivers, and personal care assistants, from receiving
overtime and minimum wage protections generally provided under Fair Labor
Standards Act).
14. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 555 (2000) (commenting allowing agencies
to gap-fill encourages drafting of ambiguous rules that can be interpreted at a later
time without following formal APA rulemaking procedure); see also John M.
Scheib, Oyez, Oyez, The Administrative Agency is in Session: A Look at the Role of Agencies
and Courts in Recent Cases Applying the Chevron Doctrine, 61 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE
37, 39 (2016) (arguing judiciary is insulated from political concerns and therefore
proper venue to interpret ambiguity).
15. See Matt Stevens, Transgender Student in Bathroom Dispute Wins Court Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/gavingrimm-transgender-bathrooms.html [https://perma.cc/3D2J-6VTJ] (discussing
lengthy court battle initiated by Gavin Grimm that brought transgender rights to
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from a novel application that a regulation’s drafter did not anticipate.16
Second, it shows how agency interpretations may be used to avoid timely
formal rulemaking procedures and promote an administration’s political
goals.17
In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,18 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the Department of
Education’s (DOE) regulations implementing Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination silent towards an accommodation of transgender students.19
During litigation, the DOE under the Obama administration articulated a
novel interpretation extending Title IX regulatory protections to transgender students.20 Applying Auer deference, the Fourth Circuit deferred
to the DOE’s interpretation and ruled in favor of the student.21 While on
appeal to the Supreme Court, the DOE under the Trump administration
issued a contradictory interpretation excluding transgender students from
Title IX protections.22 Due to this change in interpretation, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for further consideration by the lower courts.23
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, without the use
of Auer deference, proceeded with an independent review of the regula-

nation’s attention and hinged on application of Auer deference by courts to Department of Education (DOE) interpretations of its regulations).
16. See Michael S. Leonard, School District Fires First Volley in Supreme Court’s
‘Transgender Bathroom Case’ Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 31 WESTLAW J.
EMP. 3, 3 (2017) (noting at time Congress adopted regulatory sex protections
under Title IX, DOE administrators’ intent was to eliminate sex discrimination
against women).
17. See infra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
18. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
19. See id. at 720 (noting DOE had not provided an interpretation of Title IX
regulation for circuit court to defer to when litigation commenced).
20. See Leonard, supra note 16, at 3 (stating agency’s interpretation, which was
issued during litigation in a dear colleague letter, afforded Title IX protections to
transgender students).
21. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721–23 (finding agency’s regulation was
silent and its interpretation, providing an accommodation, was reasonable). But
see Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 833–34 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (rejecting
DOE’s interpretation and not affording Auer deference in holding that separate
housing and sexual educational instruction for male and female students for personal privacy reasons was consistent with structure and purpose of Title IX).
22. See Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/cases/grimm-v-gloucester-county-school-board [https://perma.cc/
3FGB-URZN] (last updated Nov. 27, 2019) (noting Trump-era Department of Education revoked Obama-era guidance on Title IX rights of transgender students).
23. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239
(2017). Auer deference generally restricts courts’ ability to defer to agency interpretations that conflict with prior interpretations. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994). In these circumstances, an agency’s conflicting
interpretation does not implicate the agency’s “fair and considered” judgment of
the regulatory issue. See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
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tion and determined it covered transgender students.24 If the initial court
had independently reviewed the regulation, instead of deferring to the
agency’s interpretation, the court could have determined whether the individual’s rights had been violated while they were still a student.25
In 2019, the Supreme Court in Kisor v. Wilkie26 surveyed its precedent
and fashioned a five-part test providing lower courts with guidance on applying Auer deference.27 This Note argues the Court’s guidance in Kisor
will not result in a meaningful change to the way lower courts apply Auer
deference.28 Thus, agencies will continue to apply the deference doctrine
as a work-around for formal rulemaking.29 Further, the Kisor test does not
combat agencies’ encroachment on the judiciary’s role as interpreter of
law.30 Instead, the Court should replace Auer with a more flexible standard that imposes an independent judicial review while still providing
some weight to agency interpretations.31 Part II of this Note surveys the
deference doctrine’s creation, separation of powers issues, and prior constraints by the Supreme Court. Part III explains the facts and procedural
history of Kisor. Part IV examines the Court’s reasoning for limiting the
scope of Auer deference and observes similarities to existing Supreme
Court precedent. Part V applies the public interest theory to analyze motives of agency actors and provides possible alternatives to the deference
doctrine. Finally, Part VI examines the long-term impact of Kisor.
II. THE COURT ARMS AGENCIES

AND

CREATES

A

GIANT

When interpreting regulatory language, lower courts enjoy a wealth
of Supreme Court jurisprudence to provide guidance on resolving ambi24. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 400 F. Supp. 3d. 444, 464 (E.D. Va.
2019) (finding school district’s policy violated Title IX and Equal Protection
Clause).
25. Compare G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721–23 (deferring to DOE’s interpretation while Grimm was a student), with Grimm, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 456–58 (conducting independent analysis of Title IX’s regulation after Grimm had graduated
and affording protections to transgender students, including providing cause of
action to students demonstrating prima facia cases of discrimination). See Erica J.
Shell, The Final Auer: How Weakening the Deference Doctrine May Impact Environmental
Law, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,954, 10,963 (2015) (noting formal
rulemaking, promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, cannot be reversed as easily as informal rulemaking).
26. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
27. For the Court’s five-part Kisor test, see infra note 102 and accompanying
text.
28. For an analysis of Kisor’s impact on the utility of Auer deference, see infra
Part VI.
29. For a discussion on agency motivation post-Kisor, see infra Section V.A.
30. For a discussion of remaining separation of power issues, see infra Section
IV.B.
31. For a discussion of possible solutions, including eliminating Auer’s binding deference, see infra Section V.B.
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guity.32 When courts encounter ambiguity, they generally apply a single,
broad presumption that Congress intended agencies to resolve the ambiguity by “gap-filling” the regulatory scheme.33 Proponents of the deference doctrine argue it provides political accountability and increases
governmental efficiency by unifying lower court decisions and utilizing
agency expertise.34 Nevertheless, critics of Auer deference argue that allowing agencies to create, enforce, and adjudicate their own rules violates
the United States Constitution.35
A. Fashioning a Weapon: How the Court Revived Seminole Rock and
Borrowed from Chevron
While now a behemoth, the deference doctrine started modestly in
1944 in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.36 In Skidmore, the Court held that lower
tribunals should consider agency interpretations when resolving regulatory ambiguities.37 Just a year later, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,38
the Court held that agency interpretations of their own ambiguous regula32. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (holding agencies’
interpretations of their own ambiguous regulations are controlling unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (finding agency interpretation acquires controlling
weight unless erroneous or inconsistent with regulation); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding agency interpretations may persuade reviewing
courts but does not necessarily bind); United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343
(1898) (holding agencies charged with executing regulations should receive
“greatest weight” in their interpretation).
33. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,
151 (1991) (reasoning Congress authorizes agencies to interpret ambiguity because agency regulations are typically complex and require agency’s “unique expertise”). In Gavin Grimm’s case, the Obama-era DOE gap-filled the regulation’s
ambiguity in determining its sex protections extended to transgender students.
For a further discussion of the Obama-era interpretation, see supra notes 20–21
and accompanying text.
34. See Kristen E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer,
103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103, 104 (2019) (noting advocates argue Auer standardizes regulations’ meaning across jurisdictions, thereby providing notice and
predictability to regulated entities).
35. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2016 (2011) (noting inconsistencies with APA and
constitutional principle of separation of powers); Manning, supra note 4, at 639–40
(arguing judiciary should interpret the law, not agencies); see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1 (providing foundation for separation of powers
doctrine by granting each branch its own enumerated powers). For a discussion
surveying arguments that Auer deference violates the separation of powers, see infra Section II.B.
36. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
37. See id. at 140 (announcing standard of review for agency interpretations
depends upon persuasiveness and thoroughness of an agency’s consideration and
consistency with earlier interpretations).
38. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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tions were entitled to “controlling weight.”39 The Court in Seminole Rock
did not provide a rationale or legal support for its holding, and lower
courts interpreted the case to be consistent with Skidmore deference.40
Congress’s subsequent enactment of the APA in 1946 also contributed to
lower courts’ perceptions that Seminole Rock fell within Skidmore.41 Namely,
that courts must weigh agency interpretations among other considerations.42 In the APA, Congress expressly stated that courts are to “decide
all relevant questions of law,” including weighing into the meaning of
agency regulations.43
After sitting idly for years, in the 1960s, the Court cited Seminole Rock’s
holding and subsequently limited courts’ abilities to resolve regulatory ambiguity in Udall v. Tallman.44 After Udall, agency administrators dramatically increased their use of Seminole Rock in litigation involving regulatory
ambiguity.45 Simultaneously, courts and scholars began advancing practi39. Id. at 414 (providing controlling weight to agency interpretation of ambiguous regulation unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent). In Seminole Rock, the
Court stated that the drafter’s intent may also be relevant in the first instance of
interpreting competing constructions. See id. at 413–14.
40. See id. at 415–19 (giving weight to administrative construction but failing
to identify legal authority); Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 180 (2014) (describing how Supreme
Court cited to no specific authority for standard articulated in Seminole Rock); see
also Adler, supra note 1, at 7 (recounting scholars and courts interpreted Seminole
Rock’s holding as following precedent of Skidmore deference).
41. See Adler, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining scholars during enactment noted
APA’s plain language requires judicial interpretation of regulatory ambiguity).
42. See Manning, supra note 4, at 622–23 n.58 (focusing on APA’s announcement that courts decide “all relevant questions of law . . . [including]
determin[ing] the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of
Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 258 (1955))).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106 (1998) (describing
APA as agencies’ “procedural rulebook” that guides agencies where Congress has
not otherwise provided guidance). Congress, in enacting the APA, attempted to
counteract the growth of the administrative state during Roosevelt’s administration and the New Deal. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109 (2015)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing APA provided a check upon administrators to ensure they act within the scope of their statutory authorizations).
44. 380 U.S. 1 (1965). Before Udall, the Court cited Seminole Rock in only one
other case, and it was not a central tenant of administrative law. See Manning,
supra note 4, at 614. The Court in Udall did not provide any rationale for its limitation beyond citing to Seminole Rock. See Udall, 380 U.S. at 16–17 (claiming deference under Seminole Rock limited judiciary’s role to interpret ambiguity); see also
Adler, supra note 1, at 7 (highlighting that Udall, like Seminole Rock, did not articulate rationale for limiting courts’ role in interpreting ambiguity).
45. See Adler, supra note 1, at 8 (noting after Udall, lower courts provided
deference to agencies’ interpretations of regulatory ambiguity); see, e.g., Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (providing controlling weight
according to Seminole Rock); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566
(1980) (relying on Seminole Rock); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n Corp. v. Marshall, 602 F.
2d 689, 704 (3d Cir. 1979) (discussing Udall to determine if interpretation was
within scope of agency’s congressional authorization); Rust Broad. Co. v. FCC, 379
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cal and legal rationales for providing agency interpretations controlling
weight.46 A separate analysis geared towards statutory ambiguity in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.47 further fueled this
expansion of regulatory deference.48 The Court in Chevron created an analytical framework that requires lower courts to determine if the agency’s
interpretation is a reasonable reading of the ambiguous statute.49 The
Court reasoned that deference to agency interpretations of statutes is
proper because Congress implicitly or explicitly authorized those agencies
to gap-fill the statutory scheme.50
The Supreme Court in Auer, borrowing from Chevron, ruled that Congress implicitly delegates the task of interpreting regulatory ambiguity to
agencies.51 In Auer, the Court held that lower courts must give effect to
agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations, unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”52 Under Auer, the role of judicial
F.2d 480, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1967) (holding interpretation was reasonable under Seminole Rock).
46. See generally Clarke, supra note 40, at 180 (noting popular justification for
Auer was that current agency administrators provide greatest insight into meaning
of their predecessors’ regulations); Manning, supra note 4, at 629–30 (listing rationales including political accountability, expertise, and historical familiarity with
regulation).
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. See generally Adler, supra note 1, at 10 (describing Supreme Court’s development of regulatory deference doctrine by borrowing Chevron’s rationale).
49. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (outlining two-part analysis for providing deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes). Under Chevron, if congressional intent is clear from the statutory language, then the agency and courts
must defer to Congress’s intended meaning. Id. at 842–43. Second, if the statutory language is silent or ambiguous as to Congress’s intent, the court must determine if the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. Id. at 843–44.
50. See id. at 844; see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (holding that before applying Chevron, courts must determine if congressional delegation occurred); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 754 (2002)
(arguing Chevron’s inquiry into congressional delegation departed from prior rationalizations that deference was proper because it implicated agency expertise).
51. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 460–62 (1997) (applying principles of
Chevron to regulatory scheme). Auer is recognized as a “close cousin” to Chevron.
Hickman & Thomson, supra note 34, at 107. A recent study of agency administrators that drafted regulations found only half of the drafters were familiar with Auer.
See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 297, 309 (2017) (citing Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1061–66 (2015)). This indicates administrators
had substantially less familiarity with Auer as compared to Chevron and Skidmore. See
id. Notably, the study did not address whether name recognition caused this difference or if administrative drafters did not consider ambiguity in drafting regulations. See id.
52. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)); see also Manning,
supra note 4, at 657–59 (detailing how courts’ “plainly erroneous” analysis requires
fact-specific investigation of regulation’s meaning, but allows agencies to provide
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review is to keep agency administrators within their jurisdictions and committed to the values and purposes expressed during the legislation process.53 If a court determines that the regulation or agency interpretation
does not meet Auer deference’s standard, it can employ Skidmore, a less
deferential standard that resolves ambiguity by weighing agency
expertise.54
Proponents of Auer deference argue it enhances governmental efficiency, utilizes agency expertise, and provides political accountability for
policy decisions.55 They also argue that agencies, which promulgate regulations, are better positioned than courts to reconstruct the original meaning of the regulation.56 They claim Auer deference is simple and easy for
lower courts to apply.57 But since deciding Auer, the Court has provided
numerous limitations on the doctrine that make its application more onerous for lower courts.58 Thus, the argument that Auer deference is straightinterpretations that deviate substantially from regulation’s fairest reading). For
further discussion of how courts have grappled with whether a regulation is plainly
erroneous, see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
53. See CROLEY, supra note 5, at 100 (noting rules that deviate from goal of
legislative authorization will likely be invalidated). By applying the “plainly erroneous” analysis, courts determine if agency administrators’ interpretations align with
congressional authorization. See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 279 (“The role of courts
has not been so much reduced as shifted, from the control of administrators’ substantive discretion to control of their procedural discretion.”).
54. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 159
(2012) (applying Skidmore after determining Auer was inapplicable). Under Skidmore, agencies receive deference proportional to the persuasiveness of its interpretation. See id. Although the Court anticipates use of Skidmore when Auer deference
is inappropriate, it does not indicate when courts should apply Skidmore or, in the
alternative, provide independent judicial review. See Hickman & Thomson, supra
note 34, at 106.
55. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 34, at 103–04 (recounting practical
rationales for Auer deference, including uniformity among courts, certainty in results, and predictability to litigants and administrators); Shell, supra note 25, at
10,957 (noting recent congressional gridlock has increased reliance on agency
rulemaking); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 51, at 307 (arguing deference to
agency administrators increases governmental efficiency by using agency’s subjectmatter expertise).
56. See Adler, supra note 1, at 26 (discussing “common sense” rationale that
agencies, as drafters, are in better position than courts to interpret ambiguity).
57. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 34, at 104 (advocating that Auer supplies predictability to lower court rulings).
58. See, e.g., Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155 (limiting use of Auer if its application
causes an unfair surprise to regulated entities); Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
256–57 (2006) (declining to follow Auer when regulatory language mimics statutory language, known as the “anti-parroting canon”); Christiansen v. Harrison
County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (limiting use of Auer to truly ambiguous regulations); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) (requiring
courts to accept plausible constructions even if it is not best or most natural interpretation); Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (declining Auer if agency’s interpretation was developed in non-binding discussion); Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 532 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to
apply Auer deference in non-precedential decision). See generally Hickman &
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forward to apply has become less persuasive as the doctrine has become
increasingly complicated.59 Moreover, the doctrine’s presumed benefits
cannot outweigh its constitutional implications because “[c]onvenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government . . . .”60
B. Positioning the Battlefield: Auer Deference Raises Constitutional
and APA Concerns
Critics of Auer deference contend that it creates a lack of notice to
regulated parties and allows agency interpretations to intrude on the judiciary’s role.61 First, critics argue Auer encourages agencies to promulgate
ambiguous regulations because agency rulemaking is not subject to oversight by a separate branch of government.62 Therefore, agencies have less
incentive to promulgate clear regulations when its interpretations of ambiguity can receive binding deference.63 Instead, agencies can leave gaps in
rules to be filled later through informal rulemaking that clarifies ambiguity depending on the political environment and desired regulatory outcome.64 Because ambiguous regulations can have more than one
meaning, regulated entities do not receive adequate notice of how an
agency will apply its rule, and without sufficient notice, entities cannot
ensure their activities comply with agency regulations.65 Thus, if courts
Thomson, supra note 34, at 103–05 (stating Auer’s various limitations has made it
more difficult for courts to apply).
59. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 34, at 105. For a further discussion
of limitations on Auer deference, see infra Section IV.A.
60. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944
(1983) (holding governmental efficiency alone will not cure laws or procedures of
their constitutional issues).
61. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 35, at 2016 (noting Auer’s inconsistencies
with rulemaking procedures of APA and constitutional principle of separation of
powers).
62. See generally Manning, supra note 4, at 617 (arguing agencies are able to
self-interpret regulations and are only constrained from “plainly erroneous” readings). Auer grants agencies authority to interpret, or reinterpret, their own regulations. See id. at 626. Whereas, in the statutory scheme, Congress cedes control of
interpretations to agencies. See id. Unlike agency rule promulgation, Congress, in
drafting statutory language, has an incentive to minimize ambiguity. See Adler,
supra note 1, at 12.
63. See Clarke, supra note 40, at 181 (arguing that agencies intend to promulgate ambiguous regulations and later issue clarifying interpretations).
64. See Manning, supra note 4, at 669 (arguing judicial deference cuts against
central goal of rulemaking: to provide public with “reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly” (alteration in original) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))).
65. See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 291 (detailing that APA’s purpose was to provide notice of anticipated rulemaking and reasoning of final rule to regulated entities). The Supreme Court has expressly restricted courts’ ability to employ Auer
when an agency’s interpretation would cause regulated parties “unfair surprise.”
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012) (internal quo-
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afford novel agency interpretations with the weight of law, then the public
loses its opportunity to participate in formal rulemaking.66
Second, critics and numerous Supreme Court Justices have argued
that Auer deference infringes on the judiciary’s power to interpret the
law.67 Specifically, they contend that deference violates the nondelegation doctrine—a central tenant of separation of powers that asserts one
branch of government cannot permit another branch to substantially exercise its powers.68 Critics argue that the judiciary tolerates an intrusion of
its powers by allowing agencies to interpret regulatory ambiguity.69 Conversely, proponents of Auer argue that judges interpreting regulatory ambiguities constitutes policymaking and likewise violates separation of
tation marks omitted). For a further discussion of this limitation, see infra notes
126–29 and accompanying text.
66. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (advocating for rigors of notice-and-comment rulemaking and arguing deference provides agencies with less demanding rulemaking process); see also
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (contemplating public input as central tenant in agency
rulemaking); Croley, supra note 43, at 116–17 (noting APA comment period is
open to all interested parties).
67. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 110 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (questioning validity of Auer deference given courts’ constitutional
role in interpreting law); Perez, 575 U.S. at 132–33 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (raising
concerns on deferring to positions adopted through means outside formal
rulemaking and commenting “serious constitutional questions lurk[ ] beneath”
Auer deference); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 588 U.S. 597, 621 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing Auer contradicts separation of powers and has no meaningful
justifications); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell. Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2001) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing it “seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation
of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well”); see
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.” (emphasis added)); Manning, supra note 4, at 632–38 (noting inconsistencies with courts providing binding deference to agency interpretation of ambiguous regulations and judiciary’s requirements under APA and Constitution).
68. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 82 (1985) (detailing nondelegation doctrine’s
historical foundations). Further, powers of the government should be spread
across the branches of government and not concentrated in a single branch. See
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 303 (1989) (outlining two diametrically opposed explanations for separating powers: (1) to promote governmental efficiency; and (2)
not to promote efficiency but to preclude exercise of arbitrary power); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (warning against one branch holding all powers of government).
69. See Manning, supra note 4, at 631 (describing administrative agency’s ability to create and interpret regulations as unifying two powers of government the
Constitution’s framers intended to be separated). Justice Jackson referred to the
practice of judicial deference to agencies as “administrative authoritarianism” and
argued it diminished courts’ ability to interpret the law. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 216 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). He argued judicial deference
would not be “fair and equitable” if it is counter to a regulation’s plain meaning.
Id. at 215 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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powers.70 Critics, joined by several Supreme Court Justices, also have
noted Auer’s contradiction with the APA’s requirement that courts decide
questions of law.71 In contrast, Auer proponents argue courts comply with
the APA because Congress implicitly delegates agencies the authority to
interpret ambiguity.72
Interestingly, the Court, which first supported an implied congressional delegation in Chevron, has since found its rationale unpersuasive in
the realm of statutory ambiguity.73 The Court incorporated this concern
into Chevron deference’s two-part analysis for statutory ambiguity, in what
is called Chevron’s “step zero.”74 Under step zero, the Court determined
that ambiguity alone in statutory language is insufficient to infer that a
delegation of authority occurred; instead, courts must find that an actual
delegation by Congress occurred.75 There is no step zero equivalent in
Auer deference, and resolving regulatory ambiguity still rests on a presumption of an implied delegation by Congress.76 In recent years, numerous Supreme Court Justices have signaled their willingness to revisit Auer,
70. See Manning, supra note 4, at 626 (arguing policymaking should be handled by representative institutions and not the judiciary).
71. See, e.g., Perez, 575 U.S. at 109 (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting that
APA has no statutory provision suggesting Congress intended to give agencies deference to interpret ambiguity of their own regulations). For further discussion of
the APA, see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 4, at 622. The text of the APA exempts
actions committed to agency discretion from judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2018). Further, in circumstances where agencies have discretion, the APA limits
review to “abuse of discretion.” See Manning, supra note 4, at 622–23 n.58 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jaffe, supra note 42).
73. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 243–44 (2006)
(noting renewed interest by Supreme Court in whether agencies had authority to
interpret ambiguity as opposed to inquiring only into agency expertise).
74. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (establishing requirement that Congress must explicitly delegate power to agencies to act
with force of law, through formal adjudication or rulemaking procedure, under
APA); see also Clarke, supra note 40, at 189–90 (finding step zero requirement limited use of deference doctrine by requiring initial determination on whether Legislature made affirmative choice to delegate to agencies).
75. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 321–22 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (indicating that before courts may apply Chevron, they must first look to
whether an agency interpretation warrants deference by determining if Congress
directly delegated authority to interpret ambiguity). Further, the Court elaborated
that courts are able to determine whether Congress intended to grant deference to
agency actors. See id. at 322.
76. See Manning, supra note 4, at 639 (“[W]hereas Chevron retains one independent interpretive check on lawmaking by Congress, Seminole Rock leaves in
place no independent interpretive check on lawmaking by Congress.”). Some proponents of Auer argue it does in fact have a step zero because the courts ask
whether the regulation is actually ambiguous. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 40, at
190. This is not the same question as Chevron’s step zero, which asks whether Congress intended for the agency to interpret the particular ambiguity. See Adler,
supra note 1, at 12–13.
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therefore it is unsurprising that Kisor v. Wilkie came before the Court to
challenge the deference giant.77
III. PULLING BACK

THE

SLING SHOT: THE FACTS

OF

KISOR

In Kisor, the petitioner asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the
regulatory deference doctrine and to overturn Auer and Seminole Rock.78
Although the Court admitted that the question of overturning Auer and
Seminole Rock did not fully rest on Kisor’s facts,79 a brief summary illuminates how the issue came before the Court. First, Section III.A discusses
the facts of the case to explain the regulation in question and its ambiguity.80 Next, Section III.B examines the procedural history, analyzes how
lower courts interpreted the issue, and discusses what role, if any, Auer
deference played.81
A. Drafting a Soldier: Making Kisor’s Case
In 2006, James Kisor, a Vietnam War veteran, moved for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to reopen his claim for disability benefits.82
Kisor first sought disability benefits in 1982, alleging that he developed
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from his participation in a military
action, Operation Harvest Moon.83 At the time, the VA found Kisor did
not suffer from PTSD and denied his request for benefits.84 In reopening
his claim, Kisor sought retroactive coverage from the date of his initial
77. See, e.g., Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s decision to deny certiorari on
whether to overturn Auer); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 133 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (stating willingness to revisit Auer’s premises when constitutional questions exist in applying APA provisions); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 597, 621 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasizing constitutional flaws in Auer as it violates “one of the great rules of
separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation”); Talk
Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell. Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–68 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting defects in Auer, such as issues with tasking an agency to both promulgate
and implement rules).
78. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
79. See id. at 2409 (indicating the question of whether courts appropriately
applied deference doctrine in a particular case would not impact Supreme Court’s
reasoning on whether to overturn Auer).
80. For a further discussion of Kisor’s claim, see infra Section III.A.
81. For a further discussion of procedural posture of Kisor’s case and lower
courts’ holdings, see infra Section III.B.
82. See Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining requirements to reopen Kisor’s claim included submitting new documentary evidence), vacated and remanded sub nom. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1361–62. Kisor, while not diagnosed with PTSD, was diagnosed with
intermittent explosive disorder and atypical personality disorder. Id. at 1361 (noting diagnosed conditions did not qualify as basis for disability claims).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

660

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: p. 647

application.85 After conducting a new VA evaluation, the agency determined that Kisor did in fact suffer from PTSD and granted benefits from
the date the VA reopened his case.86 The VA denied Kisor retroactive
benefits pursuant to a regulation requiring veterans to provide “relevant”
service records not considered in the agency’s initial denial of benefits.87
Kisor presented two new service records, both confirming his participation
in Operation Harvest Moon.88 The VA found Kisor’s records irrelevant
because the documents did not address the reason for its initial denial,
that he had suffered from PTSD.89
B. A Rock Gliding Through the Air: Kisor’s Case
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the VA’s retroactivity decision, finding that the documents related to Kisor’s participation were not
“relevant” under the regulation.90 The Board agreed that Kisor’s new documents did not relate to the reason for its initial denial.91 The Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed, also finding the documents were
not “relevant.”92 It expressly rejected the need for an Auer deference
85. See id. at 1363 (recounting Kisor’s argument that he was entitled to benefits spanning back twenty years because VA erred in its previous decision and failed
in its general duty to assist veterans).
86. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (indicating VA could have granted
retroactive benefits to Kisor if it found his new service records were “relevant”
under its regulation). The regulation stated:
[A]t any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA receives or
associates with the claims file relevant official service department records
that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA
first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the claim . . . . An award made
based all or in part on the records . . . is effective on the date entitlement
arose or the date the VA received the previously decided claim, whichever
is later . . . .
38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1), (3) (2019) (emphasis added).
88. Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1364 (noting Kisor’s submission included service personnel records and daily logs created during Operation Harvest Moon).
89. Id.
90. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409. The case was brought before a single Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). See id. ALJs are members of the Executive Branch and do
not enjoy the same independence as Article III judges. See Karen S. Lewis, Administrative Law Judges and The Code of Judicial Conduct: A Need for Regulated Ethics, 94
DICK. L. REV. 929, 938 (1990). Parties to the agency adjudication, after exhausting
the agency appeal process, may seek judicial review by an Article III court, as provided in the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)–(d) (2018) (setting formal adjudication
process for administrative agencies); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (addressing right to
appeal agency action for judicial review).
91. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409 (referring to VA’s argument that Kisor’s new
service records had to relate to VA’s May 1983 decision for denial: whether Kisor
had PTSD). Instead, the Board found that Kisor’s documents went to whether he
engaged in combat. Id.
92. Kisor v. McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517, at *2–3 (Vet. App. Jan.
27, 2016) (finding petitioner’s argument, that an earlier effective date was warranted, unpersuasive based on regulatory language), aff’d sub nom. Kisor v. Shulkin,
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analysis to address whether the pertinent regulatory language was
ambiguous.93
Kisor then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which conducted an Auer deference analysis by first assessing whether the regulation was ambiguous.94 The VA interpreted its regulation to mean that “relevant” documents must go to the reason for the
agency’s initial denial of benefits.95 Kisor instead argued the regulation
only called for documents to relate to some requirement for obtaining benefits.96 The Federal Circuit found the term “relevant” ambiguous and,
notably, stated both parties provided reasonable interpretations.97 Nevertheless, the court applied Auer and gave effect to the VA’s interpretation.98
Kisor appealed for a panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, but the Federal Circuit denied both.99 Kisor then appealed to the Supreme Court
and asked it to overrule Auer and Seminole Rock.100

869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.
Ct. 2400 (2019).
93. Id.
94. See Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1361 (stating regulation was ambiguous and Kisor’s
case rested on VA’s interpretation of term “relevant”). The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction to review whether an administrative court misinterprets a regulation.
Id. at 1365 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2018)).
95. See id. at 1366–67 (“[R]ecords ‘include, but are not limited to: . . .
[s]ervice records that are related to a claimed in-service event, injury, or disease,
regardless of whether such records mention the veteran by name . . . .’ ” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Appellant’s Br. at 8–9, Kisor, 869 F.3d 1360 (No.
2016-1929)); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1)(i) (2019) (defining service records).
96. See Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1366 (outlining Kisor’s argument that regulation at
issue is silent as to whether records must relate to denial).
97. Id. at 1368.
98. See id. (holding Auer deference was proper because VA’s interpretation
was reasonable and not plainly erroneous).
99. See Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam). A
dissenting judge argued the Federal Circuit should have applied the pro-veteran
canon. See id. at 1379 (O’Malley, C.J., dissenting). This canon comes from Supreme Court precedent holding regulations and statutes concerning veterans
should be “construed liberally in favor of the veteran.” Id. (O’Malley, C.J., dissenting). The judge argued the proper order would have been for the pro-veteran
canon to supersede Auer deference. See id. (O’Malley, C.J., dissenting) (first citing
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011); then citing Brown v. Gardner,
513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994)). The Supreme Court did not pick up this order of
operations question on appeal and it remains unanswered. See generally Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
100. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (granting certiorari but limiting
issue to whether Court should overrule Seminole Rock and Auer deference).
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IV. RELOADING THE SLING SHOT: THE COURT ADOPTS A FIVE-PART
ANALYSIS TAKEN FROM EARLIER LIMITS ON AUER
Instead of overturning Auer, the Kisor Court surveyed its precedent
and created a five-part analysis for courts to use when applying Auer.101
Before affording Auer deference: the regulation must (1) be “genuinely
ambiguous” after applying all “traditional tools of interpretation”; and the
interpretation must (2) be “reasonable”; (3) be an “authoritative” or “official position”; (4) implicate the agency’s substantive expertise; and (5) reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment.”102 The majority argued
the five-part test would provide guidance for lower courts to determine
when an agency’s interpretation warrants deference.103 Despite this, Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion contended the majority’s holding does
not go far enough to rectify Auer’s faults.104
A. Doing the Same Thing, Expecting Different Results: Kisor’s Reliance
on Stare Decisis
The majority in Kisor candidly admitted that much of its five-part analysis is a restatement of established Supreme Court precedent limiting
Auer.105 Significantly, the first two steps of the new Kisor scheme are analogous to the two-part Chevron analysis.106 First, the Court stated regulations
must be “genuinely ambiguous” where there is a fundamental doubt as to
the regulation’s meaning.107 This is not a novel limitation on Auer deference; in fact, as early as Seminole Rock, the Court specified lower courts
should not provide deference to clear regulatory language.108
101. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410–18 (2019) (explaining Supreme
Court precedent applied varying levels of stringency to Auer deference).
102. See id. at 2414–18.
103. See id. at 2414.
104. See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (rejecting majority’s decision to
uphold Auer and claiming it should have been “easy” to overturn).
105. See id. at 2414. The Court expanded on its prior guidance to lower
courts and compared the new five-part test to standards employed by courts in the
past. See id. The Court emphasized that, under all standards, courts have always
been obligated to perform a “reviewing and restraining function.” Id. at 2415.
106. See id. at 2414–15 (comparing Kisor’s approach to Chevron). For a further
discussion of Chevron’s two-part analysis, see supra notes 47–50 and accompanying
text.
107. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (rationalizing limits of Auer). The Court
warned if a regulation is clear on its meaning or provides for only one reasonable
interpretation, then the courts should not defer to any other interpretation. Id.
Further, the Court stated providing deference in such a situation would “permit
the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
108. See id. (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)). For further discussion of Seminole Rock’s limitation that interpretations be
provided controlling weight only if regulation is ambiguous, see supra notes 39–46
and accompanying text.
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For the first time, however, the Court in Kisor articulated how to determine whether a regulation is ambiguous.109 Courts must conduct a
separate analysis using all traditional tools of interpretation, including examining the text, structure, history, and purpose of the regulation.110
This analysis should occur as if the courts were reviewing the ambiguity on
first impression, without an agency’s interpretation to review.111 The
Court explained that lower courts could resolve ambiguities without
resorting to Auer deference by applying traditional tools of interpretation
in good faith.112
Under Kisor, the second step requires courts to determine whether
the agency’s interpretation is a “reasonable” construction of the ambiguous regulation.113 The Court explained reasonable agency interpretations
must fall within “the zone of ambiguity,” as identified through the court’s
own efforts in employing traditional tools of interpretation in Kisor’s first
step.114 By employing traditional tools of interpretation, courts independently determine the range of permissible interpretations.115 Kisor’s reasonableness step clarifies earlier confusion regarding the level of scrutiny
109. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. Before Kisor, the Court established Auer
deference was proper only if the regulation was genuinely ambiguous, but it did
not provide the tools or forms of analysis courts should use to determine ambiguity. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 34, at 105–06 (finding precedent unclear
as to what tools courts should deploy to analyze ambiguity); see also Christiansen,
529 U.S. at 588 (holding Auer deference improper if used to interpret unambiguous regulations).
110. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (announcing courts must utilize “all the
‘traditional tools’ of construction . . . before concluding that a rule is . . . ambiguous”) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837,
843 n.9 (1984)).
111. See id. (emphasizing courts must diligently analyze complex regulations
and not “wave the ambiguity flag” just because they do not have prior familiarity
with its subject matter). The Court in Kisor clarified that a court can only continue
in the five-step analysis after exhausting all tools of interpretation. Id.
112. Id. (asserting courts are capable of understanding legal and technical
complexities in regulatory schemes without needing to defer to agency expertise).
113. Id. at 2415–16 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
515 (1994)).
114. Id. (recognizing deploying traditional tools of interpretation allows
courts to determine whether regulations are ambiguous and if an agencies’ interpretation are reasonable).
115. See id. The second step of Kisor is similar to the “fairest reading” approach advocated by Justice Scalia. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597,
622 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Decker, Justice
Scalia advocated for utilizing traditional tools of interpretation to determine the
regulation’s fairest reading. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Unlike Kisor, Justice Scalia argued once the fairest reading was determined,
courts do not need to look to agency interpretations. See id. at 626 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Kisor majority instead argued that
an agency’s interpretation is still relevant as long as it “fall[s] ‘within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation.’ ” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (quoting Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013)). For a further discussion of the “fairest reading” approach, see infra Section V.B.1.
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courts should use to determine whether an agency’s interpretation was
“plainly erroneous.”116 Before Kisor, courts were uncertain whether the
“plainly erroneous” construction of Seminole Rock and Auer suggested a
higher level of deference to an agency’s interpretation of regulations than
statutes receive under Chevron.117
Courts use the next three Kisor steps to determine whether the “character and context” of the interpretation supports a presumption that Congress intended the agency’s interpretation to have controlling weight.118
First, the interpretation must be an “authoritative” or “official [agency]
position,” which excludes low-level or informal statements given in the
day-to-day administration of the agency.119 The Court emphasized interpretations do not have to be authorized by an agency’s head to have the
backing of the agency, but the interpretation must be more than the
words of an administrator or an informal office memorandum.120 While
unmentioned by the Kisor majority, earlier cases addressed this notion and
held deference is improper for unofficial statements by administrators and
non-precedential agency decisions.121
Second, the interpretation must demonstrate the agency’s substantive
expertise.122 The Court elaborated that agency expertise weighs heavily in
favor of the presumption that Congress delegated interpretive authority to
the agency.123 The Court reasoned if an agency does not have expertise
relating to the regulated area, then Congress “presumably” would not have
116. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (equating Kisor’s reasonableness standard to
the second prong of Chevron).
117. Id. (“Some courts have thought . . . that at this stage of the analysis,
agency constructions of rules receive greater deference than agency constructions
of statutes. . . . But that is not so. (citation omitted)).
118. Id. (establishing courts must test presumption of congressional intent).
To do so, the Court provided Kisor steps three through five to aid courts in determining whether Congress would have wanted the agency’s interpretation to receive binding deference. Id.
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing imprecision of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding what is considered an agency’s “official position” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. See id. (requiring interpretations to originate from administrative actors
with power to make policy in regulated area and through channels indicating actor’s authority).
121. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 n.9 (1980)
(deferring to official staff memoranda, published in Federal Register without agency
head’s approval, after finding memoranda utilized agency’s substantive expertise);
Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 532 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to defer to
non-precedential, one-time, agency decision).
122. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417 (noting agencies’ substantive expertise and technical knowledge provide guidance for courts).
123. Id. To support this notion, the Court examined precedent on determining which agency interpretation to defer to when regulatory power is divided between two agencies. Id. Under these circumstances, the Court provided deference
to the agency in the best position based on their level of subject-matter expertise.
Id.
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delegated authority.124 This step, requiring that agency interpretations
demonstrate subject-matter expertise, is not a new limitation to Auer
deference.125
Lastly, the interpretation “must reflect [the agency’s] ‘fair and considered judgment.’ ”126 The Court explained lower courts should avoid deference when an interpretation conflicts with an earlier one, or when it
seems to be nothing more than a “convenient litigating position” or “post
hoc rationalizatio[n].”127 Further, Kisor prohibits deference if it would
cause an “unfair surprise” to regulated parties.128 The Supreme Court acknowledged this is not a new limitation to Auer deference and conceded
that courts rarely grant deference to conflicting interpretations.129
Despite its thorough examination of precedent, the Court ultimately
upheld Auer on stare decisis grounds.130 Stare decisis mandates a “special
justification” for overturning settled law that is more than arguing the
Court wrongly decided the issue initially.131 Instead, overturning prece124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (denying Auer
deference where an agency’s interpretation did not implicate the agency’s substantive expertise). Commentators argue this limitation is an effective way to limit
courts’ deference to agency actors. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1, at 24–25 (explaining win rates for agencies seeking Auer deference decreased after Gonzalez
limitation).
126. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 166 (2012)) (prohibiting courts from deferring to agency
interpretations in conflict with prior interpretations).
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155); see, e.g.,
Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155 (declining deference to amicus brief filed in separate
litigation); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
128. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007)); see, e.g.,
Christopher, 567 U.S. at 154 (determining “unfair surprise” occurs when new interpretation results in penalties to regulated parties); Coke, 551 U.S. at 170–71 (finding “unfair surprise” when agency presents position in litigation counter to earlier
agency’s interpretations). Further, the Court has explained that agency interpretations are more persuasive when the agency is not a party to the litigation. See
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 209 (2011) (indicating that when
the agency is not party to litigation, a presumption exists that the agency’s interpretation is a product of fair and considered judgment).
129. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418. Gavin Grimm’s case—seeking transgender
protections under Title IX—illustrates this proposition. The Eastern District of
Virginia did not provide the Trump-era DOE’s interpretation deference because it
conflicted with Obama-era DOE interpretation. See supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text.
130. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (discussing stare decisis’s stringent standard
against overturning precedent). In Kisor, Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority
and provided the deciding vote to uphold Auer and Seminole Rock on stare decisis
grounds. See Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor Means for the Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step Deference Doctrine, YALE J. REG. BLOG (June 26, 2019), https://
yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-future-of-auer-deference-the-new-fivestep-kisor-deference-doctrine [https://perma.cc/RKQ5-3UPV].
131. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422–23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting Kisor’s argument Auer violates language of APA and separation of powers as
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dent requires either showing the doctrine is “unworkable” or indicating
how changes in the field make the doctrine a “doctrinal dinosaur.”132 After declining to overturn Auer, the Court signaled congressional action as
the appropriate avenue to overturn settled law like Auer.133 As for petitioner Kisor, the Court vacated and remanded his case to be interpreted
by lower courts in accordance with its five-step analysis.134
B. War is Far from Over: Justice Gorsuch’s Focus on
Remaining Errors with Auer
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence chastised the majority for not adequately considering Auer’s dubious legal foundation or mitigating its inconsistencies with the APA and the Constitution.135 Unlike the majority,
Justice Gorsuch argued Auer does not fall within the scope of the APA
because the Act anticipates judicial review of ambiguity.136 Justice Gorsuch endorsed a textualist understanding of the APA—requiring courts to
independently interpret ambiguity.137 Justice Gorsuch argued if Congress
intended to delegate this broad power to agencies, it would have explicitly
done so in the APA.138 Also, Justice Gorsuch refuted the majority’s policy
argument that deference to the agency is the best way to determine the
unpersuasive). Moreover, the Court confronted Seminole Rock and Auer’s rationale,
or lack thereof, and found a lack of initial legal support is not the test for overturning precedent. See id.
132. Id. at 2423 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989); then quoting Kimbel v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 458 (2015)) (finding Kisor’s case did not support these arguments and therefore was unpersuasive against stare decisis).
133. See id. at 2422. The majority asserted Congress would be within its power
to “amend the APA or any [new] statute to require . . . de novo review of regulatory
interpretations . . . .” Id. at 2422–23 (stating congressional silence, after Supreme
Court announced its presumption of congressional intent to gap-fill, indicates
Congress accepted and approved of Auer’s deference doctrine).
134. See id. at 2423–24.
135. See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (urging Supreme Court to reject
Auer because of its legal underpinnings as a court-created doctrine and Court’s
failure to reconcile it with principles of Constitution or APA). Justices Thomas,
Kavanaugh, and Alito joined sections of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence discussing
the judiciary’s role of upholding the APA and Constitution. See id.
136. See id. at 2432–35 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (advocating judiciary’s role is
to determine meaning of laws).
137. See id. 2434–35 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing Auer subverts APA by
providing agencies with alternative to formal notice-and-comment rulemaking and
by granting these informal interpretations with weight of law). For a discussion of
the rulemaking procedure outlined in Section 553 of the APA, see supra note 5.
138. See id. at 2432–33 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (refuting notion that Congress intended to implicitly defer to agencies on interpreting agency regulations
when other sections in APA explicitly delegated power of interpretation to agencies); see, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481 n.14 (1951)
(discussing how judicial review under Section 706 of the APA as originally proposed would require courts to determine discretionary authority of the agency).
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author’s intention.139 Justice Gorsuch argued this practice is misguided
because agency administrators change with presidential administrations,
as do their policies.140 Auer deference, then, allows agency administrators
to interpret their predecessors’ intent—conduct clearly forbidden for
legislators.141
Additionally, Justice Gorsuch argued the Court preserved the deference doctrine by a misplaced reliance on stare decisis.142 Unlike the majority, Justice Gorsuch discouraged Congress from overturning the
doctrine and argued the Court would be the appropriate venue.143 Justice
Gorsuch identified complications for Congress, including whether the current Congress can rebut the presumption of delegation to all past statutes
or if repeal must be done on a statute-by-statute basis.144 Instead, Justice
Gorsuch would have had the Court overturn Auer.145
V. REENTERING BATTLE: EMPHASIZING COURTS’ ROLE
TO INTERPRET THE LAW
Because much of the Court’s guidance in Kisor was a restatement of
existing limitations, the five-part test is unlikely to result in a meaningful
change to the way lower courts apply Auer deference. This Note uses the
public interest theory to understand regulators’ motives and to highlight
lingering issues with Auer deference’s assumptions.146 A public interest
theory analysis reveals that Auer deference and Kisor do not go far enough
139. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (finding Auer’s purported goal of understanding a regulation’s original meaning conflicts with deference to current regulators, whose views may not correspond with original drafter).
Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined in this part of the concurrence. Id. at 2425
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing independent judicial
review of regulation’s ambiguity best determines fairest reading).
141. See id. at 2441–42 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting courts do not provide weight to statements from legislators on meaning of statute enacted by previous legislative body).
142. See id. at 2443 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (implying majority’s creation of
a new test for lower courts is inconsistent with its emphasis on stare decisis). Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined the discussion on stare decisis. Id. at 2425
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
143. See id. at 2444–45 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (questioning Congress’s
power to overturn Auer).
144. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (questioning current Congress’s ability
to control application of Auer deference on future congressional legislation).
145. See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing Kisor’s majority created
“new and nebulous” limitations on Auer). Ironically, Gorsuch’s opinion is a concurrence to uphold Auer on the basis of stare decisis, while he indicated the doctrine is on its last breath. See id. (“[T]oday’s decision is more a stay of execution
than a pardon. The Court cannot muster even five votes to say that Auer is lawful
or wise.”).
146. The public interest theory focuses on the public’s ability to monitor regulatory decision-makers. Croley, supra note 43, at 5. For a further discussion of
public interest theory and its application to regulatory actors, see discussion infra
Section V.A.
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to address whether agency interpretations are politically motivated. Instead of supporting a complete break from the deference doctrine, this
Note advocates for the Court to return to a Skidmore-type analysis when
Congress does not explicitly delegate interpretive authority.147 The Court
should preserve Auer deference for circumstances where congressional
delegation has been verified by a method analogous to Chevron’s step
zero.148
A. Questioning Allegiances of Allies: Agency Motives in Regulatory Action
Under the public interest theory, scholars describe regulators as selfinterested actors who seek prolonged enjoyment of their positions and
who succumb to special-interest bargaining.149 The theory explains regulatory behavior as dependent upon the environment and considers how
regulators balance their self-interests with the desires of special interest
groups and the public.150 Notably, public interest theory exposes that
Auer deference, even after Kisor, cannot identify and limit deference to
agency interpretations motivated solely by political initiatives.151 While
the majority in Kisor argues interpretations must represent an agency’s
“fair and considered judgment,” agencies can still adopt novel interpreta147. Skidmore provides deference proportional to the “thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.” See
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). For a further discussion of
Skidmore as an alternative to Kisor’s continued reliance on a presumption of implicit congressional intent, see infra Section V.B.
148. Chevron’s step zero requires courts to first determine whether Congress
explicitly delegated an agency with authority to interpret statutory ambiguity
before employing the Chevron framework. For a further discussion of the differences between Chevron’s step zero and Auer, see supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
149. See Croley, supra note 43, at 66–70 (arguing regulatory actors are selfmotivated and applying public interest framework to explain regulatory issues).
Croley’s article applies other political science theories to explain regulatory actors’
behaviors, but this is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. (applying regulatory
rulemaking to public choice theory, neopluralist theory, civic republican theory,
and public interest theory).
150. See id. at 152 (finding this balance of interests depends on “principal–agent slack”). Principal–agent slack is the amount of awareness the public is
paying to the regulated issue. See id. at 68. In a high-slack environment, the regulator is able to escape public scrutiny and favor special interests, which provide
direct benefits to the regulator. See id. In a low-slack environment, regulators are
incentivized to pursue general interests, which are typically more aligned with the
public’s interests and provide political self-preservation. Id. at 69.
151. See generally id. at 67 (“[R]egulators pursue special-interest regulatory
outcomes when doing so furthers their self-preservation, and they pursue more
general interests . . . when doing that furthers their political self-preservation.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432–33 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing Kisor’s analysis does not address agency actors’ own
interests and policy goals).
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tions as parties to the litigation or after litigation has begun.152 The
Court’s limitation, though aimed at protecting regulated parties from “unfair surprise,” does not account for interpretations motivated by political
initiatives or ones that are not the fairest reading of the regulation.153
Further, a recent increase in the number of amicus briefs submitted
by agencies during litigation suggests Auer deference incentivizes agencies
to promulgate broad and ambiguous regulations.154 The majority in Kisor
assumes agency expertise provides a neutral and objective basis for the
agency’s interpretations.155 Proponents of Auer argue reliance on subjectmatter expertise will limit regulators from using Auer for political objectives.156 Nevertheless, this viewpoint by Auer’s proponents does not fully
account for agency administrators’ political and personal motives.157 In
hearing Kisor, the Supreme Court may have been more strategic than it
152. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (restricting deference if agency’s interpretation “conflict[s] with a prior” interpretation (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). Returning
to Gavin Grimm’s case, the current Kisor test denies deference to contradictory
positions, such as the one adopted by Trump-era DOE, to limit political motivation. Although, the limitation does not ask if the DOE under Obama implemented its novel interpretation—to provide transgender students protection
under Title IX—for political reasons. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying
text.
153. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418; Croley, supra note 43, at 119 (noting lobbyists regularly interface with the White House to influence agency decision-making); id. at 152 (commenting public interest theory finds judicial review “likely
reduces regulatory slack by subjecting agency decisionmaker’s behavior to scrutiny
by an institution not directly involved in the development of regulatory policy and
thus not vulnerable to whatever pressures otherwise affect regulatory outcomes”).
154. See Kristin Lustila, Ethical Duties of Expert Supreme Court Counsel, 24 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 659, 665 (2011) (finding amicus brief submissions by government
and private groups increased more than forty percent from 1982 to 2002). In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of amicus briefs in litigation as a
work-around for more formal APA rulemaking procedures. See Eisenberg, supra
note 9, at 1223 (highlighting use of amicus curiae briefs to advance presidents’
political agendas). Because the courts provide deference to amicus briefs, agencies have less incentive to promulgate rules through notice-and-comment procedures. See id. Proponents of Auer claim any incentive to agencies is merely
theoretical. See Brief of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Affirmance at 2,
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15), 2019 WL 1057906, at *3. Further, they argue
there is no evidence any theoretical incentive to agencies has come to fruition. See
id. at *12 n.5 (citing William Yeatman, Note, An Empirical Defense of Auer Step Zero,
106 GEO. L. J. 515, 519–20 (2018)) (detailing methodology of empirical research
on rate agencies prevailed when invoked Auer over a twenty-year period and found
the win rate fell significantly).
155. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413 (noting expertise as an agency advantage
when making policy judgments); see, e.g., Diver, supra note 11, at 589–90 (arguing
agency experience and expertise justify judicial deference).
156. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (denying Auer deference where an agency’s promulgated rule does not implicate the agency’s substantive expertise).
157. See Croley, supra note 43, at 110 (noting agencies have incentive to seem
impartial to special interests during formal notice-and-comment period because
comments provide basis for judicial review).
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chose to recognize, because the case did not raise questions on the
politicization of agencies.158
Additionally, Auer limits public participation in rulemaking by deferring to interpretations rendered outside typical notice-and-comment
rulemaking.159 Therefore, the public does not have the opportunity to
voice its concerns with the policy decision.160 The public interest theory
explains this behavior through the concept of a “Burkean” regulator:
someone who acts in a paternalistic manner to promote an agency’s ideological commitment to a regulatory goal.161 Due to the public’s inability
to participate in the agency’s interpretations, regulatory actors under Auer
can make policy decisions in a paternalistic and politically motivated manner.162 Therefore, Auer deference, even after Kisor, allows agencies to
make policy changes in an artificial “Burkean” environment where regulators are immune from even heightened public interest on a regulated
issue.163
The majority opinion in Kisor contends agencies are politically accountable to the President and have to face the public if they do not up158. Compare Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409 (noting the VA’s interpretation remained consistent throughout litigation), with G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822
F.3d 709, 718–19 (4th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging the DOE interpretation drastically shifted during litigation), and Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551
U.S. 158, 171 (2007) (finding an agency memorandum entitled to Auer deference
despite recognizing agency had “struggled” with interpretation for almost thirty
years depending on political party of administration in office).
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (delineating agency notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements under the APA). The statute requires agencies to provide notice and an opportunity for all interested persons to participate in rulemaking. See § 553(b)–(c). The public participates in this process by submitting
comments, data, views, or arguments. See § 553(c).
160. See Clarke, supra note 40, at 181 (arguing Auer does not afford the public
an opportunity to voice its opinions when agencies later clarify vague regulations
passed under notice-and-comment rulemaking).
161. See Croley, supra note 43, at 67 (establishing agency actors can be motivated to do what is “best” for the public (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Under public interest theory, agency administrators acting in a “Burkean” manner
are acting in a high-slack environment, where the public is unaware or uninformed
about regulatory initiatives. For further description of high-slack environment, see
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
162. See Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law: The U.S. and Beyond, PENN LAW:
FAC. SCHOLARSHIP 3–4 (2016), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=2657&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/HZ6CYESS] (discussing enormous amount of discretion given to agency administrators).
163. See Croley, supra note 43, at 120–22 (outlining economic costs of public
participation in agency rulemaking is less than barriers to Legislature’s adjudication). To participate in rulemaking, interested members of the public need to be
aware of agency’s interest and prepare and submit a comment. See id. at 121 (recognizing that in highly technical regulated areas, interested parties must engage
with technical data used to support agency’s proposed rule, and parties may need
to supply its own data to influence rulemaking).
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hold the existing regulatory framework.164 This contention seems
doubtful because agency administrators are unelected officials, either career administrators or officials appointed by the Executive.165 It remains
unclear what legal remedy the public would have beyond using the political system to vote the President out of office.166
B. Dusting Off a Weapon of Last Resort: Skidmore and Chevron Provide
Solutions in Replacing Auer
Lingering constitutional and policy issues associated with Auer make it
unclear which branch of government can overturn the doctrine.167 As set
forth by the Kisor majority, Congress could correct the issues with Auer, but
in contrast, Justice Gorsuch argued the judiciary should resolve Auer’s issues.168 Practically speaking, the Court’s ability to simultaneously overturn Auer and implement a new standard makes it the most effective venue
for change.169 In debating a standard to replace Auer, critics and Supreme Court Justices disagree whether it should be a “fairest reading”
standard or a reversion to Skidmore deference.170 This Note advocates for
164. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (advocating agencies are
politically accountable to the public because they are supervised by President).
165. See Coglianese, supra note 162, at 3 (commenting agencies are usually
staffed by unelected officials and arguing it is dubious to expect the public to hold
the President politically accountable for agency actions).
166. See id. (emphasizing legal scholarship lacks empirical research on democratic accountability of agency administrators).
167. Compare Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (advocating Congress can overturn
Auer), with id. at 2444–45 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (advocating Supreme Court is
proper venue to overturn Auer).
168. Furthermore, Justice Gorsuch argued stare decisis is not as rigidly formulated as the Kisor majority suggested. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). For a further discussion of the majority opinion’s reasoning that stare decisis prevents the
Court from overturning Auer deference, see supra notes 130–34 and accompanying
text. For a further discussion of Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning that the majority’s
reliance on stare decisis is misplaced, see supra notes 142–45 and accompanying
text.
169. See Manning, supra note 4, at 691 (arguing removing binding deference
would result in uncertainty among lower courts on when to provide ambiguous
language independent judicial review).
170. See, e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (commenting
overturning Auer would revert judicial review to Skidmore standard); Decker v. Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 622 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating for
independent judicial review, known as “fairest reading” approach); Clarke, supra
note 40, at 177 (arguing both Skidmore and “fairest reading” approach would be
inadequate to replace Auer); Manning, supra note 4, at 686–90 (advocating for
Skidmore review). In Decker, Scalia advocated for utilizing traditional tools of interpretation to determine the regulation’s fairest reading. Decker, 568 U.S. at 622.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Unlike Kisor’s second step, after a court determines a regulation’s fairest reading, it does not need to weigh an agency’s interpretation. See id.
at 626.
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inputting Chevron’s step zero and Skidmore into the Auer deference
analysis.171
1. Independent Judicial Review: “Fairest Reading” Standard
One alternative to Auer deference would be to deny courts the ability
to consider agency interpretations entirely.172 Under this approach, regulatory ambiguity would be resolved by courts’ independent determinations
of a regulation’s fairest reading.173 The “fairest reading” approach emphasizes that, as in other areas of law, courts have the ability to grapple
with complex issues of ambiguity, and regulatory interpretation should be
no different.174 While this solution resolves delegation issues under separation of powers and the APA, it also eliminates the benefits of agency
expertise that act as guideposts for courts.175
2. Skidmore’s Balancing Test
Another approach to replace Auer would be to revert to a Skidmore
analysis.176 Under this approach, courts retain the benefits of agency expertise and provide deference appropriate to the persuasiveness of an
agency’s interpretation.177 Skidmore allows courts to resolve ambiguities
without requiring agencies to go through lengthy traditional notice-andcomment rulemaking.178 Critics of Skidmore argue it discourages regu171. For a further discussion of Chevron’s step zero, see supra notes 73–76 and
accompanying text.
172. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 122–23 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (advocating independent judicial review is required in interpreting
ambiguous regulations).
173. See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell. Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–68 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (finding fairest reading of regulation aligned with agency’s
interpretation and therefore Auer is not needed); see also Decker, 588 U.S. at 618
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing courts should be “bound by what [rules] say, not by
the unexpressed intention” of their drafters).
174. See Decker, 588 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating “fairest
reading” approach by using textual tools to determine reasonable construction of
ambiguous regulations). The Kisor majority’s second step also requires courts to
utilize textual tools of interpretation to determine reasonable constructions of the
regulation. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16. Unlike Kisor, the “fairest reading” approach does not provide deference or weight to agency interpretation. See Decker,
588 U.S. at 622.
175. See Brief of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Affirmance, supra
note 154, at *23–24 (claiming fairest reading would result in conflicting judgments
from courts and, without reliance on agency expertise, create uncertainty for regulated entities regarding compliance).
176. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 4, at 618 (finding Skidmore deference provides solution to Auer’s constitutional issues); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2016) (envisioning a return to Skidmore
deference).
177. For a further discussion of Skidmore’s use of agency expertise, see supra
note 37–39 and accompanying text.
178. See Adler, supra note 1, at 26 (arguing, without use of Auer, agencies
could still persuade courts of the validity of their interpretations). For instance, if
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lated parties from participating in formal rulemaking.179 They claim regulated parties, by remaining silent and not bringing rulemaking concerns
to the agency, would be more likely to succeed later in a challenge to
ambiguous terms under Skidmore than under Auer.180 Nevertheless, an
agency would be able to rectify this misuse by promulgating a new rule
providing clarity to the ambiguity.181
3. Tiered Approach: Incorporating Step Zero and Skidmore
This Note proposes employing a tiered approach to Auer deference
that incorporates step zero and Skidmore. Under a tiered approach, courts
would first conduct a Chevron step zero analysis applied within the regulatory context. This would allow courts to determine whether an explicit
authorization from Congress occurred before applying Auer.182 Supporters of the deference doctrine may argue that the final three steps of the
Kisor analysis attempt to bring Kisor closer to step zero in Chevron.183 But
this argument fails because differences between statutory and regulatory
frameworks result in a lack of agency oversight during and after rule promulgation.184 By including an explicit congressional authorization step,
the courts could continue in a simplified Auer analysis that would retain
the first two steps of Kisor.185 Like Chevron, the first two steps of Kisor
the Skidmore standard had been applied in Gavin Grimm’s case, the judiciary would
have had more leniency to weigh whether the policy violated Title IX. For a further discussion of courts’ role in interpreting ambiguity under Skidmore, see supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
179. See Clarke, supra note 40, at 192 (arguing Auer, unlike Skidmore, encourages regulated parties to participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking and
brings ambiguity to agency’s attention, so that they can better anticipate agency’s
subsequent application and interpretation of the rule). Additionally, Justice Scalia
argued reverting to Skidmore deference would create uncertainty among courts
about how much weight to give to an agency interpretation. See United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing “Skidmore
deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation” given
current complexity of administrative state).
180. See Clarke, supra note 40, at 192 (noting regulated parties would be less
likely to raise concerns because this would provide clarity to the regulated area,
and therefore eliminate ambiguity).
181. For a further discussion of the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking,
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (limiting review
in Chevron to exclude economically or politically significant cases); Mead Corp., 533
U.S. at 221 (limiting review in Chevron to instances were courts can be certain Congress delegated authority).
183. For further discussion of Kisor analysis looking to the “character and context” of Auer to determine whether Congress implicitly delegated to the agency, see
supra notes 118–29 and accompanying text.
184. For further discussion of statutory and regulatory differences in rule promulgation, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
185. Hence, Congress’s explicit delegation of interpretive authority would
render steps three through five unnecessary. See supra Section IV.A.
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would be retained to determine whether there is genuine ambiguity and
whether the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable construction.186
But if the courts do not find an explicit congressional delegation
under step zero, then courts would apply Skidmore. Likewise, if the court
finds an explicit congressional authorization—but the agency’s regulation
was unambiguous or its interpretation unreasonable—the court would apply Skidmore. The second tier would mandate a Skidmore review to provide
deference proportional to the persuasiveness of an agency’s interpretations.187 Courts thereby retain the ability to utilize agency expertise and
knowledge of highly technical and specialized areas.188 Under Skidmore,
courts can consider agency interpretations as a recommendation among
other considerations, including the regulation’s fairest reading.189
VI. A GIANT OR MERELY A SITTING DUCK:
WHAT REMAINS OF AUER AFTER KISOR
Regardless of doubts about Kisor’s lasting impact, its holding is significant in the immediate future because it requires lower courts to apply the
five-part test before deferring to agency interpretations.190 Because much
of Kisor’s holding is a restatement of existing precedent, it is unlikely its
five-part framework will result in any meaningful change to the way lower
courts apply the deference doctrine.191 To date, lower courts have employed varying levels of stringency when applying Kisor.192 Contrary to the
186. For a discussion of Chevron’s two-part test, see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
187. Requiring this step would resolve the question of when courts should
apply Skidmore. For a discussion of prior confusion among lower courts about
when to employ Skidmore, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
188. See Adler, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing agency expertise does not translate
into an authorization by Congress to gap-fill the regulatory scheme). This approach retains utility of agency expertise without divining Congressional authorization from that expertise. Id.
189. For further discussion of the five-step analysis reviewing courts must implement before deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations, see
supra Section IV.A.
190. Compare Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171
(2007) (finding agency’s interpretation entitled to Auer deference, even though
agency struggled with interpretation and question of ambiguity since the 1990s),
with Spencer v. Macado’s, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 3d 545, 552–53 (W.D. Va. 2019) (denying Auer deference because agency interpretation reversing thirty-year-old policy
during change in political administration constituted an unfair surprise). This
could indicate that lower courts may follow Kisor to avoid unnecessary use of Auer.
See Spencer, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 552 (finding circumstances surrounding agency’s
interpretation suggested it was a policy change rather than an effort to determine
meaning of regulation).
191. For further discussion of persisting issues with Auer after the court’s limitation in Kisor, see supra Part V.
192. See, e.g., Am. Tunaboat Ass’n. v. Ross, 391 F. Supp. 3d 98, 114 (D.D.C.
2019) (finding agency regulations “opaque” but affording deference using Kisor
test); E. Or. Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 445 P.3d 251, 270–73 (Or.
2019) (applying Kisor test by analyzing text, structure, and history of regulated in-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss3/4

28

Krafka: Strategies to Bring Down a Giant: Auer Deference Vulnerable After

2020]

NOTE

675

Court’s intention to simplify and standardize the judiciary’s task, some
lower courts continue to overrely on agency interpretations.193 Other
courts faithfully execute the Court’s test.194
Auer deference has encouraged the growth of the administrative state,
but Kisor’s new articulation of the doctrine did not cure its constitutional
faults.195 Given the Court narrowly decided the case on stare decisis
grounds, Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion will likely lay the groundwork for the Court to overturn Auer in the future.196 The Kisor majority
suggests the onus is on Congress to set aside Auer.197 However, Congress
may heed Justice Gorsuch’s warning that a decision to overturn Auer
“would explode with constitutional questions.”198 The Court may instead
realize at a later time that it is the proper venue to decide the legality and
wisdom of Auer deference. For now, lower courts are left to apply Kisor’s
five-part test before deferring to an agency’s interpretation under Auer.

dustry before establishing whether regulation was ambiguous); Md. Dep’t of the
Env’t v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carrol Cty., No. 06-C-15-068141, 2019 WL 3561897, at
*49–50 (Md. 2019) (Getty, J., dissenting) (arguing deference in the case should be
limited because majority did not partake in Kisor analysis using tools of
construction).
193. See, e.g., Am. Tunaboat Ass’n, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (determining ambiguous regulation under Kisor by looking to text but not employing other interpretation tools); Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopedic Assoc. II PC, 935 F.3d 187,
205–06 (3d Cir. 2019) (conducting brief Kisor analysis before expeditiously determining regulation was ambiguous and agency’s interpretation entitled to
deference).
194. See, e.g., Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 295–97 (4th Cir. 2019) (conducting lengthy Kisor analysis and declining to afford Auer deference because it
would lead to “unfair surprise”); Belt v. P.F Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 3d 512, 530–31 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding regulation ambiguous but denying
deference because interpretation was not result of agency’s “fair and considered
judgement”).
195. For further discussion of Auer’s remaining separation of powers issues
after Kisor’s holding, see supra Section IV.B.
196. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444–45 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (undermining Court’s reliance on stare decisis because precedent is built on
Seminole Rock’s foundation, which lacked legal support).
197. See id. at 2422 (noting Congress has the ability to overturn Auer regardless of the Court’s holding in Kisor). Before the holding in Kisor, Congressional
representatives introduced a series of legislation attempting, yet failing, to overturn Auer. See Jowanna N. Oates, Saying Goodbye to Chevron and Auer? New Developments in the Agency Deference Doctrine, 91 FLA. B.J. 43, 44 (2017) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2018)) (discussing attempts by Congress to statutorily overturn Auer); see also Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115 Cong. § 202 (2017); Separation of
Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114 Cong. § 3 (2016).
198. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2444–45 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting constitutional restraints on Congress may prevent it from overturning Auer).
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